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In quantum key distribution implementations, each session is typically chosen long enough
so that the secret key rate approaches its asymptotic limit. However, this choice may be
constrained by the physical scenario, as in the perspective use with satellites, where the
passage of one terminal over the other is restricted to a few minutes. Here we demonstrate
experimentally the extraction of secure keys leveraging an optimal design of the prepare-and-
measure scheme, according to recent finite-key theoretical tight-bounds. The experiment is
performed in different channel conditions, and assuming two distinct attack models: indi-
vidual attacks, or general quantum attacks. The request on the number of exchanged qubits
is then obtained as a function of the key size and of the ambient quantum bit error rate.
The results indicate that viable conditions for effective symmetric, and even one-time-pad,
cryptography are achievable.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technique for sharing a random secret key by means of a
quantum link between two distant partners, traditionally called Alice and Bob. For this purpose,
an optical link is established with Alice acting as the sender and Bob as the receiver in a prepare-
and-measure scenario, or with both receiving a signal from an intermediate source [1]. The secret
key that is obtained may be used in any symmetric cryptographic algorithm including the one-time
pad encryption introduced by Vernam [2] or computationally secure ciphers such as AES.
QKD may be considered the first successful example of a quantum information protocol that
reached the everyday applications. Indeed, commercial devices communicating via optical cables
are already operated worldwide. The perspective use in free space is also considered very attractive.
This use includes terrestrial links, in the case that it is not possible to use optical cables, or in the
case that either terminal is moving, including the very relevant case of key exchange with orbiting
terminals, that is, satellite QKD. This extension of the QKD application has been fostered for years,
being included in the major Quantum Information Roadmaps [3–5], and has been the subject of
several feasibility studies [6–12].
However, the intrinsic difficulties in its realization allowed only the experimental demonstration
of the single photon exchange with an orbiting terminal [13]. Moreover, in free-space links the
gathering of light from the background is much more pronounced than for optical fibers. At the
same time, in the case of long distance terrestrial links or space to ground links, signal attenuation is
typically greater by at least three orders of magnitude. As a consequence, strong noise overimposed
to an attenuated signal results in a poor signal to noise ratio (SNR) and in an increased quantum
bit error rate in the sifted key.
The experimental investigation of such limit is therefore of crucial interest, in order to open
the way to direct experiments in the free-space QKD, and the recent result on finite-key bounds
by Tomamichel et al. provides the necessary theoretical framework [14]. As the final goal of this
work we aim to prove experimentally the bound for the number of exchanged raw key bits that is
necessary to extract a secret key of desired length. This is the recipe needed to design the terminal
dimension and performance in practical applications.
Any QKD protocol consists of a physical quantum communication layer and a post-processing
layer, in which, by using a classical communication channel, the secret key is extracted from the
raw data shared by the two terminals: first the raw data is sifted in order to distill maximally
correlated data between Alice and Bob, then an information reconciliation protocol is performed
3in order to correct the errors between the two users and finally a privacy amplification algorithm
is used in order to ensure the secrecy of the final key.
A crucial parameter is the so called secure key rate, i.e., the ratio of the number of secret bits
that can be extracted to the number of correlated, or raw, bits obtained in the quantum layer
of the protocol. According to standard QKD unconditional security proofs, the secret key rate
is upper-bounded by the asymptotic limit which is achievable in the limit of infinitely long keys
(see for instance [1]), with the use of shorter blocks leading to lower key rates. However, in QKD
implementations, the length of processed blocks is chosen as a trade-off between link duration
constraints and memory resources on one side and efficiency (in terms of secret key rate) on the
other. This trade-off usually results in long blocks, of at least a million sifted bits. However, in some
scenarios such a choice may rather be constrained by the physical channel, as in the perspective
use with satellites, where the passage of the orbiting terminal over the ground station is restricted
to a few minutes in the case of low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite [9, 13] or to a fraction of one hour
for the medium-Earth-orbit (MEO) ones [10]. Hence, for practical use of QKD in cryptography,
it is of crucial importance to develop and test methods that give the achievable secure key rates
in the bounded-key-length scenario, since the number of exchanged bits between the two parties
is always finite. In the last years, great efforts from the quantum communication community were
directed to this subject, due to its relevance for a number of application scenarios [15–21]. We
would like to underline that all previous published experimental work on finite-size key security
were based on a far more inefficient bound as compared with the one obtained in Tomamichel et
al., Ref. [14].
In this work, we study the security and the generation rate of a protocol for key exchange in
the finite-key regime and in presence of noise, whose value is experimentally varied up to the top
limit. The security is assessed with reference to a recently introduced theoretical result [14], for
which “almost tight bounds on the minimum value” of exchanged qubits “required to achieve a
given level of security” were obtained [14], as well as for a realistic bound described below. In
particular, by leveraging the optimal design of the prepare-and-measure scheme complying with
the above mentioned tight theoretical bounds, we evaluate how the secret key rate scales in different
channel conditions, depending on the protocol parameters. We consider two possible attack models,
referring to two different levels of secrecy: pragmatic secrecy, which ensures resiliency against
individual attacks, and general secrecy, which ensures resiliency against the most general quantum
attacks.
4II. RESULTS
A. Protocol for quantum key distribution.
We will adopt here the protocol described in [14], a derivation of the well known BB84 proto-
col [22]. According to this protocol, one of the two bases is used to encode the raw key bits while
the other basis is used to test the channel for the presence of the eavesdropper [23]. Moreover,
the two bases are selected by Alice and Bob in the preparation of the qubits and in their measure,
respectively, with non equal probabilities, unlike the standard BB84.
Let us describe in more detail the quantum communication part of the QKD protocol used
in the present experiment, characterized by the sifted key length n and the number of bits used
for parameter estimation k; both parameters can be chosen according to the required secret key
length and channel conditions as described below. Alice prepares and sends to Bob quantum states
encoded by means of photon polarization. She can choose between two bases, X = {|H〉, |V 〉} and
Z = {|+〉, |−〉} with |±〉 ≡ (|H〉 ± |V 〉)/√2. For each basis, the first state represents the bit 0
and the second state the bit 1. Alice sends to Bob the raw key (namely a sequence of uniformly
random bits) by randomly and asymmetrically encoding the bits with one of the two bases: with
probability pX =
1
1+
√
k/n
she encodes the bits in the X basis and with probability pZ = 1− pX she
encodes the bits in the Z basis. Bob measures the photons by randomly choosing a basis, X or Z,
with the same probabilities pX and pZ.
Alice and Bob broadcast their bases choices over the classical channel and Bob also commu-
nicates when he received the photons; bits corresponding to non received photons are discarded.
Otherwise, when Alice and Bob have both chosen the same basis (it happens with probability
p2X for the X basis and with probability p2Z for the Z basis) they store the respective bits, while,
when they have chosen different bases, their bits are discarded. The protocol repeats the quantum
communication as long as either the number of X bits is lower than n or the number of Z bits is
lower than k. In order to obtain the final sifted keys, Alice and Bob keep the same n bits, randomly
chosen, from the X bits to form the sifted key strings X = {xi} and X′ = {x′i}. Similarly they
choose k random bits from the Z bits to obtain the parameter estimation strings Z = {zi} and
Z′ = {z′i}. Differently from [14], we defined the sifted key as X and not as the union set of X and
Z. The X bits will be used to build the final secret key and the expected number of errors between
X and X′ is the crucial parameter in the design of the information reconciliation protocol. The Z
bits will be used to test the presence of the eavesdropper and the number of errors between Z and
5Z′ is used for dimensioning the privacy amplification procedure. Note that the probabilities pX
and pZ are chosen to satisfy p
2
Z/p
2
X = k/n in order to minimize the number of exchanged photons
before the quantum communication is stopped.
After the quantum transmission and the sifting of the raw data, four subsequent tasks take place:
parameters estimation, information reconciliation, error verification and privacy amplification. The
first task, parameters estimation, is required to measure the quantum bit error rate (QBER) on
the Z basis, QZ.
Furthermore, we assume that the quantum channel is stable, i.e., that QBER on the X-basis,
QX, is constant in time (note that, in general, QX 6= QZ). If QX increases (for instance because
an attacker is tampering with the channel), then the information reconciliation will fail. The
failure will be detected during the error verification phase, and the protocol will abort. On the
other hand, the empirical QBER in the Z basis is dynamically computed at each protocol run
as QˆZ = (
∑k
i=1 zi ⊕ z′i)/k, to check for the presence of an eavesdropper. The protocol aborts if
QˆZ > Q
Z
tol, where Q
Z
tol is a given channel error tolerance on the Z basis which has been determined
a priori based on the expected behavior of the quantum channel and the required level of security.
Information reconciliation allows Bob to compute an estimate Xˆ of X by revealing LEC bits
(LEC represents the classical information leakage). We define Pfail as the upper bound to the
probability of a reconciliation failure and εcor as the upper bound to the probability that Xˆ differs
from X. We fixed a threshold QXmax such that the empirical QBER QˆX in the sifted key is higher
than QXmax with probability less than Pfail/2. For details on the chosen information reconciliation,
error verification and privacy amplification mechanisms, see the Methods section.
B. General and pragmatic secrecy
As introduced above, in this work we consider two possible attacker models, which in turn entail
two different notions of secrecy, which we call general and pragmatic, respectively. General secrecy,
as defined in [14], requires that the final shared keys are secret with respect to the most general
quantum attacks, and it is based on the secrecy criterion provided in [24]. We say that the distilled
key S is εsec-GS (general secret) if for any attack strategy
min
σE
1
2
‖ρSE − ωS ⊗ σE‖1 ≤ εsec
(1− pabort) , (1)
being ‖ρ‖1 = Tr
√
ρρ†, pabort the probability that the protocol aborts, ρSE the quantum state which
describes the correlation between Alice’s classical key S and the eavesdropper, ωS the fully mixed
6state on S, and σE a generic quantum state on the eavesdropper’s Hilbert space. Then, if the bases
X and Z are chosen as described above and assuming that Alice uses an ideal single photon source,
the authors of [14] show that an εsec-GS key can be extracted out of the reconciled key, with length
` ≤ n(1− h˜2(QZtol + µ))− LEC − log2
2Pfail
ε2secεcor
(2)
where µ =
√
n+k
nk
k+1
k ln
2
εsec
, h2(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the binary Shannon entropy
function, h˜2(x) = h2(x) for 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5 and h˜2(x) = 1 for x > 0.5.
On the other hand, pragmatic secrecy [25] ensures that the final key is secret with respect to
intercept-and-resend (IS) attacks [26], i.e., a specific class of selective individual attacks, which,
however, represents the most realistic and feasible attack strategy based on the experimental tech-
nology nowadays available: collective or more general attack models (see [1]), in fact, require
ancillary qubits and quantum memories in order to be deployed.
While in a long-term perspective (more than 50 years) general security is the goal, in the near
future (5-10 years), we know that an ideal IS attack is the best option that an eavesdropper can
choose because the quantum memory needed for a general or coherent attack is not yet available.
In the Experimental Results subsection, we will show that there are situations in which no key
can be extracted if general security is required, while a pragmatically secure secret key can be
obtained. In these cases, requiring general security, a protection far above actual possibilities of
an eavesdropper, prevents key generation. Also, we would like to stress that pragmatic secrecy,
unlike computational secrecy, offers forward security: if a key is produced today with pragmatic
secrecy (without quantum memory available for Eve), the key or a message encrypted with it will
be secure for any future use.
As a criterion for pragmatic secrecy, we use a bound on the classical equivocation at the eaves-
dropper, namely we say that the distilled key S is δsec-PS (pragmatic secret) if, for any IS attack
strategy and in the case that the protocol is not aborting,
H(US)−H(S|V ) ≤ δsec
1− pabort (3)
being US the uniform key with the same length as S, V the classical random variable which sum-
marizes all the information available to the eavesdropper and H(S|V ) the equivocation (conditional
entropy) of S given V . Note that eq. (3) implies the uniformity and the security conditions
H(S) ≥ H(US)− δsec1−pabort (uniformity)
Iacc(S;E) ≤ δsec1−pabort (security)
(4)
7where the accessible information Iacc is the maximum mutual information I(S;V ) = H(S)−H(S|V )
that can be extracted from the quantum system E [24]. Moreover, choosing δsec =
2
ln 2ε
2
sec in (3)
implies condition (1) for non-coherent attacks (see Methods section). It should be noted that, as
for incoherent individual attacks, eq. (3) guarantees composable security, as the eavesdropper,
without a quantum memory, cannot exploit the “locking property” of the accessible information
(see [24]).
The pragmatic security of the distilled key can be assessed through the following result, the
proof of which is provided in the Methods section.
Theorem 1: The distilled key S is δsec-PS if
∃ a ∈ N : f(a, `) ≤ δsec (5)
where
f(a, `) = ` max
q
[
Iq(a+ 1, n− a)I1−q/2(k(1−QZtol), kQZtol + 1)
]
+
2−(nEC−`−a)
ln 2
, (6)
with nEC = n − LEC − dlog2(Pfail/εcor)e and Ix(a, b) denoting the regularized incomplete beta
function [27, section 6.6],
Ix(a, b) =
B(x; a, b)
B(1; a, b)
, B(x; a, b) =
∫ x
0
ta−1(1− t)b−1 dt. (7)
Based on (5), we can therefore choose the optimal secret key length as
` = max
{
b : min
a
f(a, b) ≤ δsec
}
(8)
Please note that, in order to allow a comparison with the tight bound (2), we have derived the
secure key length in the hypothesis that Alice uses a single photon source.
Finally, given the probability εrob that the protocol aborts even if the eavesdropper is inactive
[14], we can compute the final secret key rate for both general and pragmatic secrecy as
r(`, n, k, εrob) = (1− εrob) `
M(n, k)
(9)
where M(n, k) = n+k+ 2
√
nk is the expected number of qubits that have to be sent until n sifted
key bits and k parameter estimation bits are collected.
C. Experimental results
We conducted experiments with different noisy channels yielding different values for the average
QBERs QX and QZ, each of them realized with different encoding probabilities (pZ, pX). We varied
8FIG. 1. Experimental bits. Joint empirical distribution of sent and received bits, as obtained in one exper-
iment with the best channel conditions (corresponding to QX = 0.33% and QZ = 1.48%). The probabilities
of sending and measuring in the X and Z basis were pX = 0.51 and pZ = 0.49, respectively.
the noise value in the channel by coupling to the receiver an external unpolarized source of suitable
intensity, that increased the background signal. It is worth noting that by this operation we are
modelling the following depolarizing channel
C : ρ→ (1− P )ρ+ P
4
3∑
j=0
σjρσj , (10)
where σj are the Pauli matrices, being σ0 the identity and P the parameter representing the
probability that any detected photon is coming from the background.
In figure 1 we show the joint empirical distribution of the transmitted and received bits on the
X and Z bases obtained in one run with the best environmental conditions (i.e., with additional
background), for the case pZ = 49% and pX = 51%. As expected, in this case the QBER is very low:
the main source of errors are imperfections in the waveplates used in the measurement, yielding
QX = 0.33% and QZ = 1.48% on average.
In Figure 2 we show the measured experimental key rates for each data set and for both general
and pragmatic secrecy. First of all, let us recall that, in order to consistently compare the secrecy
rates obtained with general and pragmatic secrecy, the security parameters εsec and δsec have to be
chosen so that δsec =
2
ln 2ε
2
sec. As a performance reference, we plot the asymptotic theoretical bound
r = 1 − h2(QX) − h2(QZ), holding in the limit of infinite length keys (labelled as “asymptotic”
in Fig. 2) and the optimal theoretical bound for εsec-GS keys (labelled as “numerically optimized
pZ” in Fig. 2). The experimental key rates are obtained by the following procedure: for each
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FIG. 2. Experimental key rates. Experimental secret key rates r vs. sifted key length n for different
probabilities of encoding and measuring on the two bases pZ, pX = 1−pZ and for different channel conditions
(values of the average QBERs QX, QZ): (a) QX = 0.3 %, QZ = 1.5 %; (b) QX = 2.4 %, QZ = 3.9 %; (c)
QX = 4.9 %, QZ = 6.0 %; (d) QX = 8.3 %, QZ = 8.1 %. For each case we report the key rates obtained
for εsec-GS (solid lines) and δsec-PS (dashed lines) keys with εsec = 10
−10, δsec = 2ln 2ε
2
sec, Pfail = 10
−3 and
a correctness parameter εcor = 10
−10. The standard deviation of experimental rates are on the order of
10−3 for both εsec-GS and δsec-PS keys. Error bars are not reported in the plot for the sake of clarity.
For comparison, we also report the asymptotic key rate in the infinite length limit, and the εsec-GS bound
achievable by optimizing the probability pZ and the thresholds QZtol, Q
X
max for each value of n.
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data set the n-bit sifted key X and the k-bit parameter estimation string Z (X′ and Z′) at Alice’s
(Bob’s) side are obtained by the experiment. The error correction is performed on X and X′ by
using the Winnow scheme; in particular, the Winnow parameters were chosen so that a maximum
of 6 subsequent iterations is allowed with block sizes up to 256 bits. We then performed privacy
amplification by compressing the error-free keys by multiplication with a random binary Toeplitz
matrix. The amount of compression depends on `, the secret key length, given by eq. (2) and (8)
for general and pragmatic security, respectively. On the other hand, the optimal bound for εsec-GS
keys is numerically derived by maximizing the secret key rate r (eq. (9), with ` given by eq. (2))
over pZ , Q
Z
tol and Q
X
max for each n.
In the numerical procedure used to find the optimal bound for εsec-GS keys, since an analytical
expression is not available for LEC or εrob, LEC is approximated as LEC = 1.1 · n · h2(QX) and,
similarly, εrob is replaced by the following upper bound (see equation A5 of ref. [28] for details):
εrob ≤ exp
[
−k(Q
Z
tol −QZ)2
1− 2QZ ln
(
1−QZ
QZ
)]
(11)
Experimental values obtained for εrob show that such bound is rather loose. On the other hand, as
QX increases, the approximate expression for LEC is lower than the average value for the Winnow
scheme. As a consequence, the experimental secret key rates may slightly exceed the optimal bound
in some low QBER cases, as we can see in fig. 2a.
As a further comment, we note that, for an asymmetric channel with QX < QZ, using the
Z basis for key encoding and X for eavesdropper detection provides a higher optimal secret key
rate (9). However, when the two error rates QX and QZ have similar values, a minor gain in r is
obtained. For instance, when n = 106, εcor = εsec = 10
−10, with QZ = 4% and QX = 2%, we can
achieve r = 0.31; by exchanging the role of Z and X, r = 0.33 can be achieved.
In situations such as satellite quantum communications, the amount of sifted bits is expected
to fluctuate as it depends on the variable channel conditions during the passage. From the ex-
perimental point of view it is easier to fix the values of pZ and pX and accumulate data as long
as possible. The value of pX will constrain the ratio between k and n according to the relation
pX =
1
1+
√
k/n
. In the performed experiments, we thus fixed the value of pZ and pX = 1 − pZ. For
each value of the background noise we run different acquisitions with pZ belonging to the discrete
set {9%, 16%, 28%, 40%, 49%}.
Experimental results for the εsec-GS key rates are plotted with thin solid lines, while δsec-PS
key rates are plotted with thin dashed lines; different colors correspond to different (pZ, pX). We
used Pfail = 10
−3, εcor = 10−10 and εsec = 10−10. As expected, pragmatic secrecy always allows
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FIG. 3. Required bits for a secret key. Minimum number of received bits M(n, k) needed to obtain a
εsec-GS key of a given length ` (as labelled on each curve) versus the quantum BER QX. Different colors
divide the regions with different secret key lengths. Crosses represent our experimental results, the colored
regions and the solid lines that delimit them are derived from the numerically optimized bound, assuming
QZ = QX.
the achievement of higher secret key rates with respect to general secrecy, which pays the price for
the higher level of secrecy it provides. The gain becomes more evident when the channel becomes
noisier and the QBER increases. We also observe that with QX = 4.9% εsec-GS keys secure are
obtained for pZ = 16%, pZ = 28%, pZ = 40% and pZ = 49% and not for pZ = 9%, whereas, when
QX = 8.3%, only keys secure against pragmatic secrecy can be extracted with the parameters we
used.
We point out that the bounds derived for the general and pragmatic secrecy do take into
account statistical fluctuations: if the measured QˆZ is greater than Q
Z
tol the protocol aborts, while
for QˆZ < Q
Z
tol the protocol gives a secure key with security parameter εsec. As an example, given
QX = 4.9%, QZ = 6.0%, n = 100000 and pZ = 9%, the parameter µ which takes into account these
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fluctuations for general secrecy (see eq. (2)), is approximately equal to 0.15, a value which, for an
experimentally realistic number of bits disclosed during the information reconciliation procedure,
and even without the contribution of QZtol, yields the impossibility of producing a secret key.
Moreover, we notice that higher values of pZ (∼ 50%) better suit lower values of n for both
general and pragmatic secrecy in all considered cases: for instance, when QX = 0.3% in the general
secrecy case, pZ = 49% is optimal for n < 3 · 103; on the other hand, as n increases, it is possible
to decrease pZ and when n ' 105 the highest rate is obtained with pZ = 16%. This feature can
be understood in the following way: for a short sifted key X, an almost equally long string Z
(k ∼ n) is needed to reliably detect eavesdropping; when n grows, less bits of Z (in percentage)
are necessary. In fact, in the large n limit, it is possible to choose k so that k/n vanishes as n goes
to infinity and the secret key rate approaches the asymptotic bound, r = 1− h2(QX)− h2(QZ).
It is worth noting that, in the asymptotic limit, a biased choice of the bases gives a higher
secure key rate with respect to the BB84 protocol [22] whenever pX >
√
1/2. In fact, in the infinite
limit, the fraction of secure over sifted bits is given by 1− 2H(Q) in both cases (for simplicity we
here assume QˆX = QˆZ = Q); however, a biased choice of the bases gives a number of sifted bits
that is approximately p2X > 1/2 of the sent bits (also in the finite size regime), while for the BB84
protocol the sifted bits are 1/2 of the sent bits. In particular, by using a large pX, namely pX ∼ 1,
in the infinite key limit we approach a double secret key rate with respect to BB84. In Fig. 2 the
asymptotic bound of the secure key rate r, defined as the number of secure bits over number of
sent bits, is twice the corresponding asymptotic bound of the BB84 protocol.
With the obtained data we also estimated the minimum number of received qubits M that are
needed in order to obtain a key of given length `. In figure 3 we show this quantity as a function of
the QBER (in this case we assumed that QX = QZ). Solid lines represent the theoretical minimum
M necessary to obtain a general secret key for different lengths `. With markers of different colors
we indicate the experimental received qubits for the different values of `. Clearly, as the QBER
grows, it is necessary to increase the number of exchanged qubits to obtain a given key length `.
On the other hand, when the channel is almost noiseless, a secret key of reasonable length can be
extracted by using a relatively small number of qubits: for instance, more than 1000 secure key
bits can be obtained by exchanging less than 20000 photons (see Fig. 3).
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III. DISCUSSION
In conclusion, we have experimentally demonstrated the feasibility of key distillation according
to the finite-key analysis proposed in [14] and compared it with a less stringent definition of security,
called pragmatic, that protects the protocol against intercept and resend attacks. We compared
the two analyses for different amounts of depolarizing noise added to the quantum channel.
With pragmatic security, a significantly secret key rate with finite keys is demonstrated, even
in conditions near the theoretical QX, QZ bound of 11%. Its drawback is the insecurity against
collective attacks, which however are not presently available. We stress that, when the channel is
very noisy (QX = 8.3%) no key that is secure against the most general quantum attack could be
extracted up to 2 ·105 sifted bits; however, by considering only intercept and resend attacks, in this
case a secrect key rate up to 7.5% was obtained. When QX, QZ > 11% it is not possible to obtain a
secure key even in the asymptotic large n limit. This shows that, for highly noisy channels, the use
of pragmatic secrecy is a viable solution to obtain some secret bits for a experimentally realistic
number of exchanged photons. We believe that our work can have important application for free-
space quantum communication and for all QKD scenarios in which the number of exchanged qubits
is limited by physical constraints, such as in the inter-satellites link scenario.
IV. METHODS
A. Optical setup
The optical setup of our prototype implementing the quantum communication is shown in
Fig. 4. The transmitter (Alice) uses four infrared (850nm) attenuated diode lasers driven by
a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) to send the bits 0 and 1 encoded in the different
polarization bases of the photons. By properly configuring the FPGA, it is possible to set the
probabilities pX and pZ. The receiver (Bob) uses a variable beam splitter (BS) with transmission
T to send the received qubits to the measures in the two bases. The probability pX is equal to the
transmissivity T of the BS. On one BS output, a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) and two single
photon avalanche photodiodes (SPAD) measure the photons in the X basis; on the other side a
half-wave plate (HWP) is positioned before the PBS to allow the measurement in the Z basis. The
counts detected by the four SPAD are stored on a second FPGA. A cable between the two FPGA
is also used along for synchronization.
Concerning the transmitted qubits, we used the same data structure of a recent free-space QKD
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FIG. 4. Schematic of the experimental setup. The qubits are generated by attenuating four differently
polarized lasers. The FPGA board controls which laser should be turned on in each qubit transmission.
At the receiver side, by a beam splitter with transitivity T , Bob perform the measurement in the X (with
probability T ) or Z basis (with probability 1 − T ). NPBS, beam splitter; PBS, polarizing beam splitter;
HWP, half wave plate; Filters, neutral density filters, SPAD, single photon avalanche diode.
implementation [25] based on the B92 protocol [29]. A raw key is composed into N packets of 2880
bits each, which are in turn divided into 12 frames for the ease of synchronization. In fact, each
frame consists of 11 header slots and 240 payload slots, each with a duration of 800 ns. The header
exhibits the pattern ”100000xxxx1”, where ”xxxx” is the 4-bit frame number, encoded one bit per
slot in a pulse-duration modulation of the synchronization beam (a 400 ns or 200 ns pulse encode
the bit 1 or 0, respectively). As regards the payload slots, the first 200 ns are used to send the
synchronization signal; then, Alice waits 200 ns and sends two bits separated by 200 ns. It is worth
noting that the experimental setup of this protocol is very similar to the original BB84: the main
difference lies in the interpretation of received bits in the two different bases.
B. Classical post-processing
After the parameter estimation phase, information reconciliation, error verification and privacy
amplification are performed. Information reconciliation aims at correcting the discrepancies be-
tween X and X′ that the channel may have introduced, thus allowing Bob to compute an estimate
Xˆ of X. As a practical solution, we have chosen the Winnow scheme [30] which, by leveraging
Hamming codes of different lengths over multiple iterations, allows an adaptive and lowly inter-
active error correction and represents a good trade-off between the high interactivity required by
CASCADE and the low flexibility of LDPC code with limited key length.
We fix an upper bound Pfail to the probability of a reconciliation failure and, under this con-
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straint, we optimize the parameters of the Winnow scheme in order to minimize the expected
(average) classical information leakage E[LEC]. First, given the average QBER on the X basis QX,
a threshold QXmax > QX is fixed so that the empirical QBER QˆX in the sifted key is higher than
QXmax with probability less than Pfail/2. Then, the block sizes are chosen so that the output BER
is lower than Pfail/(2n) whenever QˆX < Q
X
max and E[LEC] is minimized, as detailed in [25].
Subsequently, an error verification mechanism such as the one proposed in [14] ensures that the
protocol is εcor-correct, i.e., that P[X 6= Xˆ] < εcor, by comparing hashes of (dlog2(Pfail/εcor)e) bits.
Namely, Alice chooses the hash function g randomly and uniformly from a class of universal2 hash
functions [31] (the class of Toeplitz matrices in our experimental setup) and computes her hash
value gA = g(X). She then sends gA and a compact representation of g to Bob, who computes
gB = g(Xˆ). The protocol aborts if the two hashes are different, i.e., if gA 6= gB.
Finally, during the so-called privacy amplification, X and Xˆ are compressed by means of a
function which is, again, randomly and uniformly chosen from a class of universal2 hash functions,
in order to get the final secret keys S and Sˆ. The length ` of the final key and the corresponding
amount of compression depend on the required level of secrecy, on the overall classical information
leakage LEC + dlog2(Pfail/εcor)e, on the assumed attacker’s model and on the estimate of the
information leaked to the eavesdropper during the transmission over the quantum channel.
C. Proof of pragmatic secrecy
Proof of Theorem 1: let t be the number of qubits observed and measured by Eve on the X
basis among the n sifted bits. Then the Re´nyi entropy of order 2 for the sifted key, given all the
information available to the eavesdropper, is lower-bounded by
R(X|V ) ≥ nEC − t, (12)
being R(X|V ) = −∑v pV (v) log2 (∑s p2S|V (s|v)).
Let us define the following pairs of complementary events, namely: let A = {QˆZ > QZtol} and
A¯ = {QˆZ ≤ QZtol} be the aborting and non-aborting events, whereas R = {R(X|V ) ≥ nEC − a}
and R¯ = {R(X|V ) < nEC − a} define the events of acceptable and non-acceptable eavesdropping
rate, respectively. Then,
H(S|V ) = E[log2 P(S|V )|A¯] = E[log2 p(S|V )|R, A¯]P[R|A¯] + E[log2 P(S|V )|R¯, A¯]P[R¯|A¯] . (13)
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The multiplication of H(S|V ) by the probability of not aborting yields
P[A¯]H(S|V ) = E[log2 p(S|V )|R, A¯]P[R, A¯] + E[log2 P(S|V )|R¯, A¯]P[R¯, A¯] (14)
≤ E[log2 p(S|V )|R, A¯] + `P[R¯, A¯] . (15)
Finally, by applying corollary 4 in Ref. [32] to a possibly aborting protocol that outputs a `-bit
key (i.e., H(US) = `), we have, for every a, `,
P[QˆZ ≤ QZtol](`−H(S|V )) ≤
2−(nEC−`−a)
ln 2
+ `P[R(X|V ) < nEC − a, QˆZ ≤ QZtol] . (16)
From (12), we can upper bound the probability on the right-hand side of (16) as
P[R(X|V ) < nEC − a, QˆZ ≤ QZtol] ≤ P[t > a, QˆZ ≤ QZtol] (17)
= P[t > a]P[QˆZ ≤ QZtol], (18)
since the two events in the right-hand side brackets of equation (17) refer to disjoint qubit sets,
namely those encoded in the X and Z basis, respectively, and are therefore independent. Further-
more, according to the selective individual attack model with attack rate q, t is a binomial random
variable with parameters (n, q). Similarly, the number of measured errors on the Z basis, kQˆZ is
a binomial random variable with parameters (k,QZ) and QZ = q/2. Therefore, we can rewrite
equation (18) as
P[t > a]P[QˆZ ≤ QZtol] = (1− Fn,q(a))(Fk,q/2(kQZtol)) (19)
= Iq(a+ 1, n− a)I1−q/2(k(1−QZtol), kQZtol + 1), (20)
with Fn,q(·) denoting the cumulative distribution function of a binomial random variable with
parameters (n, q), and similarly for Fk,q/2(·). The last step is then assured by equation 6.6.4 in
Ref. [27].
Eventually, condition (5), together with definition (6) and given that P[QˆZ ≤ QZtol] = 1− pabort,
ensures that for any q ∈ [0, 1] we get
`−H(S|V ) ≤ δsec
1− pabort , ∀ a, `. (21)
Relationship between equation (3) and (1): the Pinsker inequality (see section 11.6 in [33] and
[34]) ensures that
1
2
‖pSV − uSqV ‖1 ≤
√
ln 2
2
D(pSV ||uSqV ) (22)
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where uS is the uniform distribution on S and D(p||q) is the relative entropy between the p and q
distributions. By minimizing each term with respect to qV , we get
min
qV
1
2
‖pSV − uSqV ‖1 ≤ min
qV
√
ln 2
2
D(pSV ||uSqV ) (23)
=
√
ln 2
2
D(pSV ||uSpV ) (24)
=
√
ln 2
2
(H(US)−H(S|V )) , (25)
where (24) is due to D(pSV ||uSqV ) = D(pSV ||uSpV ) + D(pV ||qV ) ≤ D(pSV ||uSpV ). It is then
straightforward to see that
H(US)−H(S|V ) ≤ 2
ln 2
ε2sec
1− pabort ⇒ minqV
1
2
‖pSV − uSqV ‖1 ≤ εsec
(1− pabort) . (26)
Relationship between equation (3) and (4): the uniformity condition trivially derives from the
fact that H(S|V ) ≤ H(S). Also, from basic information theory, we know that
I(S;V ) = H(S)−H(S|V ) ≤ H(US)−H(S|V ), (27)
since S has maximal entropy (i.e., H(S) = `) if and only if it is uniformly distributed. Now,
since condition (3) is verified for any IS attack strategy, and therefore for any outcome V of the
eavesdropper measurement on the quantum system E, the security condition directly follows.
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